Excellencies,
        Distinguished Participants,
        Ladies and Gentlemen,

On behalf of the Government and people of Indonesia, I wish to welcome you all to this workshop "Towards the 2005 NPT Review Conference: Challenges and Prospects."

Let me take this opportunity to commend and thank the Government of Japan for co-sponsoring this Workshop. I would also like to express my appreciation to my colleagues from the Department of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia for working so hard to make possible this first-ever workshop on the functioning and role of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in our region.

There are a number of reasons why we have organized this Workshop. Since Indonesia became a state party to the NPT in 1979, we have shown our commitment both to the letter and spirit of the Treaty. As a declared non-nuclear-weapon-state, Indonesia has always been in the forefront of the international community, striving for nuclear non-proliferation in all its aspects and for a nuclear weapons free world. This Workshop is also intended to offer to State Parties in the Asia-Pacific region, an opportunity to an exchange of views on various issues to be dealt with by the Third Prepcom of the 200 NPT Review Conference. Moreover,Indonesia as Chairman of the Third Prepcom session feels obliged to share with its partners in the region on the state of affairs of the current issues pertinent to NPT prior to that Conference.

        Distinguished Participants,

For over three decades, the NPT has served as the cornerstone of the non-proliferation regime. This unique position derives not only from the legal and normative standards that the Treaty has established but also from the ever-increasing adherence to it by members of the international community. Indeed, the Treaty is now at a stage of near universal acceptance.

The Treaty stands on three pillars: non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. These are to be fulfilled through a matching series of undertakings by both nuclear weapon states (NWS) and non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS). Accordingly, the implementation of the Treaty should flow from those three pillars in a balanced manner.

However, there is a general feeling that implementation has fallen short of expectations, particularly with regard to nuclear disarmament. Moreover, there is increasing concern at non compliance and the associated risks of proliferation. I believe that a thorough review of the performance of the Treaty over the past decade is necessary to allow for an even-handed assessment of the difficulties that have engulfed it.

The year 1995 represented a turning point in the history of the NPT. That was when the NPT Review and Extension Conference (NPTREC) took place with the participation of all five nuclear weapon states and a great number of UN member states.

Although the Conference was unable to reach consensus on a Final Declaration on the review of the Treaty, it did agree to give the NPT an indefinite duration, and in parallel agreed to three other decisions on Strengthening the Review, Process for the Treaty, Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, and Resolution on the Middle East. These constituted a package deal that was meant to be implemented in its entirety.

Five years later, the 2000 Review Conference achieved another milestone by adopting a consensus Final Document. It contained concrete measures, including most notably the "13 practical steps" to promote and enhance the implementation of the Treaty. The international community is yet to witness their full implementation.

        Distinguished Participants,

The NPT has always been saddled with problems that sometimes require it to adapt to a new environment and problems that were not anticipated at the time of its adoption. Nevertheless, we had expected that the evolution of the Treaty would lead to its effective implementation. Unfortunately, that was not the case: in some instances, challenges to the Treaty have weakened the basic principles of the regime and, sadly, have led to considerable backsliding.

Today, new challenges confront the NPT regime. These include the proliferation of States with nuclear capabilities, one stated withdrawal from the NPT, the proliferation of nuclear weapons technologies, an instance of non-compliance, an increasing assertion of the role of nuclear weapons ini military doctrines and a trend towards the qualitative enhancement of nuclear weapons by some nuclear weapon states.

While the Treaty provides for the further development of non-proliferation measures, the challenges posed by both vertical and horizontal proliferation have become more complex. This has been reflected by the development and acquisition of nuclear weapons with aid and assistance extended by non-State Parties which undermine the credibility of the non-proliferation regime.

The possibility of acquisition of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction by non-state actors has also added a new layer of threat.

Thus, the problems confronting the Treaty run the gamut from nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation, and the application of safeguards, to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Moreover, the continuing imbalance and selectivity in the emphasis placed by different States Parties on particular purposes and provisions of the Treaty exacerbate the problems. In fact, this imbalance has been a perennial source of complaints on the NPT and is likely to pose one of the greatest challenges to the Treaty's credibility if it is not redressed.

Since the Treaty came into force, there has been a sharp increase in the imbalances in implementing the obligations and responsibilities of the nuclear-haves and have-nots. All deliberations and negotiations within the NPT regime as well as in other areas of the disarmament machinery to reduce such imbalances have reached a stalemate. There is a great need to restore balance in the fulfillment of the three pillars of the Treaty. It is essential that nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament are recognized as mutually reinforcing and must be pursued jointly instead of preferring one at the expense of the other.

It is a sad reality in our times that some countries have chosen to emphasize the role of nuclear weapons in their military doctrines, to develop enhanced and "usable" nuclear weapons and to resort to or threaten pre-emptive and preventive military action to dissuade adversaries from acquiring weapons of mass destruction and to ensure effective enforcement of the regime.

These additional challenges to the non-proliferation regime cast a shadow of doubt on the future of nuclear disarmament and further threaten the viability, efficacy and credibility of the Treaty.

Despite the Treaty's shortcomings and the criticisms leveled against it, we are heartened by the fact that the overwhelming majority of non-nuclear-weapons States Parties to the NPT continue to fully comply with their obligations under the Treaty. They remain fully committed. This attests to the success of the Treaty in constraining the increase in the number of nuclear weapon States, thereby fulfilling one of its pillars.

On the other hand, it pains us to recall the disappointment of many non-nuclear-weapon-states when in 1995 we witnessed the indefinite extension of the Treaty without a concomitant time bound framework for global nuclear disarmament. A closer look reveals, however, that the terms of indefinite extension were coupled with a balanced bargain between the parties, as codified in 1995 and 2000, and founded on a combination of legal and political commitments that must all be implemented in a balanced manner.

In my view, one of the best ways to strengthen the non­proliferation regime is through full compliance by all States Parties to the provisions of the Treaty, improvement in the functioning of the Treaty and, more importantly, the full implementation of agreements that have been reached. Furthermore, extra NPT mechanisms will undermine the non-proliferation regime.

Achievement of universality would also consolidate the normative strength of the Treaty. On the other hand, universality demands that the process should be in line with various initiatives undertaken within the framework of the NPT.

Today, we reaffirm our reliance on the NPT as the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament. In a world where stability and security continue to be challenged by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, preserving and strengthening the Treaty is vital to international peace and security.

I do not expect that in the next two and half days you will devise solutions to all of these formidable problems. This is a forum for a critical overview of the entire NPT process under current circumstances and a hard look at the provisions of the Treaty will serve us all in good stead. We hope that you will carefully review the pertinent issues in order to promote the full implementation of the Treaty, and to explore ways by which the NPT regime can be strengthened.

Thus, the results of your deliberations should contribute " substantially to our grasp of the issues involved to the success of the Third Prepcom session as well as to the 2005 NPT Review Conference. An open exchange of views in an informal setting often leads to increased understanding which in turn, should reinforce confidence among the States Parties to the NPT.

With this, I wish you every success in your discussions. I now declare this Workshop officially open. (Subdit Berita, Deplu)