August 2004
PAPUANS NEED DEMOCRACY
NOT SEPARATISM
Efforts by certain quarters, within and outside
Indonesia, to question the decolonization process in Papua gain
a momentum by the declassification of restricted documents in
the U.S. recently.
The documents portray the 1969 "Act of
Free Choice" (AFC) as a sham, among others because it excluded
most Papuans (The Jakarta Post, July 16, 2004). Arguably, this
development may provide ammunition to the hands of people pursuing
the separatist aspiration in Papua, thus endangering Indonesia's
territorial integrity and its democracy.
Questioning the decolonization process serves
no purpose at all. The main pretext used by certain quarters
to meddle in Papua is about upholding and promoting human rights,
justice and welfare for the Papuans. Admittedly, these are all
important issues that have to be pursued honestly of which the
present-day democratic Indonesia serves as the best framework.
Hence, justifying separatism is wrong and will lead nowhere
in terms of redressing those important grievances.
Law No 21/2001 issued by the Government of
Indonesia on Nov. 21, 2001 grants Special Autonomy Status to
Papua and represents an honest attempt to give an opportunity
for the Papuans to manage their own household. The Law also
contains a generous scheme for revenue sharing in which Papua
will receive around 80 percent of the money derived from forestry,
fishery, taxation, as well as gas, oil and other mining explorations.
For the Indonesians the reintegration of Papua
to the fold of the motherland, long denied by the Dutch, has
exacted a lot of costs in terms of blood and tears. The Indonesians
would therefore consider the duty to defend the Province as
an article of faith. The status of the Province of Papua as
part of Indonesia is final and was endorsed in 1970 by General
Assembly Resolution 2504.
Let us put the record straight: Papua was an
integral part of the Netherlands East Indies (NEI). From administrative
point of view, the Dutch colonial government administered from
Batavia (presently Jakarta) the whole territory of NEI. From
territorial point of view, the indivisibility of Papua as part
of NEI was recognized in the London Agreement of 1824 between
Great Britain and the Netherlands as well as reflected in the
1825 Map of the NEI which places Papua as its easternmost boundary.
When declaring independence, Indonesia's founding
fathers refer to the whole territory of NEI as the legitimate
territory of Indonesia. This is in line with the principle of
"Usi Posidentis" in which the successor state would
inherit the whole territorial boundary of a colony. As far as
Indonesians are concerned, the 1945 proclamation of independence
was in itself an act of self-determination, covering the whole
territory of Indonesia from Sabang to Merauke.
Self-determination is a one-off event and in
the case of Indonesia, took place in 1945 in terms of Proclamation
of Independence by Sukarno and Hatta. As such, all ethnic groups
in Indonesia were automatically subsumed into the Republic of
Indonesia without even being asked by way of "act of free
choice". In this context, the Papuans are "more fortunate"
than other ethnic groups in Indonesia simply because they were
given the chance to express their choice in 1969.
Furthermore, Indonesia's nationalism is not
based on certain ethnicity but possesses the nature of all-inclusiveness.
This is the very reason why the concept of "indigenous
people" with its possible implication that each group has
its own right of self-determination is not applicable in Indonesia's
context.
Indonesia embraces a long standing stance that
decolonization process should be implemented once and for all
for the whole territory of NEI, in the sense that no part of
the former colony (i.e. Papua) should be treated differently.
This stance -justified as it is in international law - represents
one of the roots of Indonesias irredentist claim over Papua.
It is also to be borne in mind that UN General
Assembly Resolution 1514 (1960) concerning the right of decolonization
did not mandate the application of the "one man one vote"
system as the only way for decolonization process. Most importantly,
the resolution underlined that self determination shall not
result in a partial or total destruction of sovereignty and
territorial integrity of the successor states.
It is important to note that following the
adoption of Resolution 1514 (1960), many new states in Africa
came into being in the 1960s without resorting to a plebiscite
or "one man one vote system". In our immediate region,
Sabah and Sarawak were also incorporated into Malaysia in 1963
without direct "one man one vote" plebiscite but by
certification of a visiting UN mission that the people in these
two regions seemingly did wish to joint the newly established
Federation of Malaysia.
The legacy of colonialism has also compounded
the application of "one man one vote" system. As we
know, colonialism brings about a condition in which many countries
in the Third World consist of many different ethnicities which
are often crisscrossing and straddling states borders in a complex
pattern. Henceforth, the rigid application of "one man
one vote" system would be detrimental to the existing state
borders and may provoke unnecessary conflicts.
In its attempt to reintegrate Papua, Indonesia
used a range of methods, including coercive diplomacy. After
it was clear that international situation (due to the height
of the Cold War) militated against the Dutch continuing its
retention of Papua, an opportunity was therefore ripe for the
conclusion of the New York Agreement in 1962, which was basically
a face saving formula for the Dutch. The final outcome of the
Agreement was considered as granted, namely the ultimate reintegration
of Papua into Indonesia.
As a matter of fact, the 1962 Agreement never
defines the method with which the AFC should be conducted in
Papua. Therefore, there is no obligation for Indonesia to employ
"one man one vote" system for the AFC, especially
in the light of difficult circumstances in Papua at that time,
both relating to the human and social conditions as well as
to the geographical situation and its inherent technical problems.
In this regard, one could not but observe with
regret the tendency to use "present lens" to interpret
past event taking place in Papua. Interpretation of such a mode
will obviously be misleading as well as out of context.
In conclusion, the AFC in Papua should be seen
within the context of bilateral agreement between Indonesia
and the Netherlands as well as the overall circumstances in
Papua in the late 1960s of which employing the "one man
one vote" system was not possible nor practical.
From the Indonesian perspective, Papua is first
and foremost an irredentist claim due to the Dutch recalcitrance
to return it to the fold of Motherland and the General Assembly
resolution 2504 (1970) has sealed its final status within Indonesia.
The unified and democratic Indonesia is the
best framework to correct the perceived injustice in Papua.
In this regard, the international community should support Indonesia's
attempt to consolidate its democracy. Indeed, fanning separatist
sentiment, including questioning the AFC under the pretext of
reestablishing history, would only weaken Indonesia's efforts
to strengthen the democratic process.
Needless to say, separatism is a solution in
search of problem and best to be avoided.