"Dealing with Aceh rebels"
by : Siswo Pramono*, School of Social Science, The Australian National University, Canberra

The Jakarta Post, Editorial-Opinion, 12 July 2002

The harsher the state of emergency (i.e. civil or military) imposed in Aceh, the easier for the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) to manipulate the corresponding tension. Aceh would become like an overheated but sealed oxygen tube, with GAM waiting for the explosion. Some aspects of military strategy must be reviewed. The government must avoid the fatal trap of GAM's asymmetric warfare.

"Asymmetric warfare" is a strategy employed by those with limited forces to exploit the vulnerability of more powerful adversaries.

In Aceh, GAM reportedly has 2,000 fighters; Indonesia has 25,000 security personnel. The recent security operations have reduced GAM's control over Aceh, from 60 percent to 30 percent of the territory, according to a recent summary report by the International Crisis Group. In no way will GAM survive the "normal" contest of force-on-force confrontation with the Indonesian security forces. GAM will attempt to offset the imbalance by modifying the strategic usage of its very limited fighting force. Its objective is to destroy Indonesia's legitimacy, not its military or police forces.

Security planners should have anticipated GAM's intentions. As the round of talks in Geneva has put the issue of Aceh right in the middle of the international stage, GAM has tried to provoke the government to pursue a military approach in Aceh.

GAM has reportedly intensified its attacks upon state officials and institutions. In the last two months the attacks have allegedly broadened to include civilian targets, including the destruction of 42 schools as well as power lines, kidnapping, and hijacking. These attacks aim for "moral panic"; Jakarta is expected to overact, rendering special autonomy incoherent.

When the government loses its coherent perspective on Aceh, its policy will, as GAM has learned from East Timor, rely heavily on the military approach. And GAM knows too well that the Indonesia military (TNI) and National Police are not in their best state of readiness for a long, protracted asymmetric war.

The TNI's troops, exhausted from endless operations to curb violence across the archipelago, can easily make mistakes. GAM has learned that the Santa Cruz incident in 1991 undermined Indonesia's legitimacy in East Timor. And the destruction of Dili in 1999 marked the end of that legitimacy.

GAM is patiently waiting for such mistakes to be repeated, sooner or later, in Aceh. In fact, there have already been many incidents, including the Rumoh Geudong "torture chamber" in Pidie, even before the issue of Aceh was internationalized. If such incidents are repeated again, Indonesia will lose its legitimacy and GAM will win international sympathy.

As such, Indonesia must avoid fatal errors that could imperil its own political legitimacy, and exploit instead reported atrocities by GAM to delegitimize its political cause.

The use of force, for one, must be carried out in the course of law enforcement. Legal action should be taken against anyone guilty of acts of terror or abuses of human rights, whether they are from GAM or from the security forces.

Moreover, the police must assume the role as point of contact between the government and the people -- a role which might need assistance if this is not the case yet.

Further, the role of the TNI must be focused on combating GAM's military infrastructure. Such a limited role requires extensive and effective intelligence. Any collateral damage inflicted upon civilians will reduce Indonesia's legitimacy in Aceh. Worse, such damage could be manipulated by GAM to intensify negative feelings (from "apathy" to "antipathy") on the part of the locals towards the military.

The extensive counterinsurgency operation must be focused on winning people's hearts and minds. Social development and rehabilitation programs run by the security forces (i.e. Bhakti TNI/ Polri) must be improved in quantity and quality.

Last but not least, Indonesia must take advantage of diplomatic solutions. In the wake of Sept. 11, no major world power will tolerate the rise of radicalism in Southeast Asia. This international support provides leverage for Indonesia in pursuing dialog with all political and social groups in Aceh, including GAM.

In short the government should formulate an anti-asymmetric strategy, encompassing the speedy implementation of special autonomy, preventive diplomacy, impartial law enforcement, and effective counterinsurgency operations. Such a complex strategy requires more focused political will and better coordination.

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*The writer is also an official at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.