Address by HE Mr S. Wiryono
Indonesian Ambassador to Australia
At the International Institute of
International Affairs Tasmania Branch Inc.
Hobart, 15 October 1996
Mr Phillip Dalwood,
Ladies and Gentlemen,
I am deeply honoured by the invitation extended to me to address this distinguished
gathering and share with you some thoughts on "Indonesia's role in
the Asian Region". It is most encouraging to see that the Australian
Institute of International Affairs - Tasmania Branch and the Asia Centre
of the University of Tasmania choose to conduct joint meetings, as such
gatherings of interesting and interested personalities can only help foster
and further promote understanding between Australia and Indonesia.
In approaching this evening's topic, I believe it would be most useful for me to explain Indonesia's foreign policy, as well as take a look at the current post-Cold War situation and the roles of ASEAN and other regional associations.
Perhaps the first thing that should be said about Indonesian foreign policy is that it has a strong undercurrent of nationalism and independence. This is the force that welds together the hundreds of ethnic groups all over the archipelago of 17,508 islands into a single Indonesian nation. Due to this unique geographical feature and its historical struggle for independence and growth into the Indonesian nation, Indonesia has developed and established a national outlook known as Wawasan Nusantara or archipelagic outlook. In the wording of the declaration of 13 December 1957, all waters, surrounding, between and connecting the islands constituting the Indonesian state, regardless of their extension or breadth, are integral parts of the territory of the Indonesian state and, therefore part of the internal or national waters which are under the exclusive sovereignty of the Indonesia state. Later, on the 18 February 1960 the firm commitment of the Indonesian government to the archipelago principle was reaffirmed, which is in fact the application of the principle of national unity to the geographic reality and configuration of Indonesia as an archipelagic state. This confirmed the idea of the unity of the Indonesian nation as contained in the 1928 Pledge of National Unity enacted in the Youth Congress of that year. At the same time, it serves to guide the nation's relations with the outside world. As a result of this strong independent outlook, Indonesia, while still a fledgling republic, adopted what has been termed as "an independent and active foreign policy".
The genesis of such a foreign policy had to do with the fact that right after the Second World War, when Indonesia was fighting to preserve its newly proclaimed independence, the world was beginning to be polarised into the two rival ideological camps of the Cold War. In a speech before the Central National Committee or KNPI, Indonesia's Provisional Legislature in September 1948, the then Vice President and Prime Minister, Mohamad Hatta said: "The Government is of the firm opinion that the best policy to adopt is one which does not make us the object of an international conflict. On the contrary, we must remain the subject who reserves the right to decide our own destiny and fight for our goal, which is independence for the whole of Indonesia".
This statement was an early expression of the non-aligned position that Indonesia would consistently take in international affairs. Essentially, what it means is that Indonesia would like to preserve its independence of judgement and freedom of action. This policy became known as the policy of "mendayung antara dua karang" or "sailing between two reefs". Under such a policy, ideally speaking, it is deemed exceedingly important that Indonesia evaluate every international issue on its own merits, and not merely follow the wishes of either of the two contending blocs in the Cold War or any other consideration apart from the national interest and the good of humankind. Through this policy, Indonesia assumed a posture of independence coupled with a readiness to cooperate with like-minded nations - particularly in the common endeavour to shape a world order of peace, social justice and equitably shared prosperity.
This approach to foreign policy is by no means unique to Indonesia. There are today some 112 other countries, all members of the United Nations, all of them in the developing world, which profess with varying degrees of intensity, the same attitude of considering international issues purely on their own merits in the light of their respective national interests and the good of humankind. Together with Indonesia, they form the largest political movement in history, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). It is noted for being at the forefront in the worldwide struggle for decolonisation, development, disarmament and the fight to put an end to apartheid. In 1992, Indonesia assumed Chairmanship of this Movement. Because Indonesia adopted an "independent and active" foreign policy right after becoming a republic, Indonesia is often described as "born Non-Aligned". The Non-Aligned Movement itself, while indeed born at the First Summit in Belgrade, Yugoslavia where it was formally institutionalised in 1961, germinated from the Asia-Africa Conference in Bandung in 1955, where the first generation of Leaders of the two continents laid down the Dasa Sila or the Ten Principles of International Relations which the Non-Aligned Movement later endorsed.
Under Indonesia's chairmanship from September 1992 to October 1995, the Non-aligned Movement succeeded in reinvigorating the North-South dialogue that it hopes will lead to a global partnership for development to address the inequities and imbalances of the current world economic order. At the same time, the Movement broadened and intensified South-South cooperation. It also succeeded in getting the seven most industrialised countries (G-7) as well as the World Bank to give due attention to the debt crisis of the highly indebted poor countries. No longer the Chairman of the Movement, Indonesia now continues to work actively for causes identified with the Movement, including the solution of the debt crisis, population planning, social reform and the development of a transparent, equitable and rule-based multilateral trading system through the World Trade Organisation.
Though the policy of non-alignment could be stated in utter simplicity, its implementation could be quite complex. As in the case of Indonesia, it could take one course or another under the influence of permanent factors - such as geography and the psychological make-up of the Indonesian people - and variables such as the external environment, the economic circumstances of the time, and the country's unique perception of these circumstances. After Indonesia had gone through the chaos of 1965, and after the failed coup attempt of the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI), the Indonesian government passed the Investment Law of 1967 which was designed to attract Western investors - something unthinkable in the previous years. At the same time, this measure represented a moving away from the socialist bloc. Still, Indonesia maintained its independent and active foreign policy. Viewed entirely on its own merits, that was one of the moves that paved the way for Indonesia's economic recovery and, subsequently, consistently high export-driven economic growth. Today the New Order Government led by President Soeharto continues to build strong economic links with the West as well as with all other countries that would enter into a mutually beneficial economic partnership with Indonesia - without in any way compromising its independent foreign policy.
This policy has worked well for the Indonesian economy. Today, Indonesia has a GDP of US $210 billion and a per capita income of about US$1,000 and is the biggest economy in Southeast Asia. Growing at an annual average of seven percent for the past two decades, Indonesia in 1995 grew by 8.07 percent, surpassing the Government forecast of 7.5 percent and the 7.8 percent growth during the previous year. Such consistently high economic growth created some 45 million new jobs between 1971 and 1994. Thus the incidence of poverty has been reduced from 60 percent of the population a quarter of a century ago to 13.5 percent today. In the meantime, the population has increased from 145 million in 1920 to 195 million in 1995. Exercising fiscal prudence and restraint, the Government has managed to keep the inflation rate under two digits; it has also succeeded in diversifying the economy away from oil. Some 13 years ago, the Government launched a sustained programme of opening up the economy through a series of deregulation and debureacratisation packages that have greatly liberalised its import policies and made it even more attractive to foreign investors.
In achieving all these, Indonesia has been guided by a basic concept called the "Trilogy of Development". In endeavouring to achieve the "take-off" towards industrialisation and to ensure continued socio-economic growth, Indonesia will continue to be guided by this concept which prescribes three inseparable and mutually supportive conditions: stability to make growth possible, growth in order to create new wealth to share, and equitable sharing of the responsibilities of the fruits of development. None of these three elements may be emphasised at the expense of any of the others, for there can be no growth without equitable distribution of the burdens of development, and there can be no fruits of development to distribute without growth. Without equitable distribution of the fruits, there can be no national stability, and without a dynamic national stability, there can be no economic growth.
The economic dynamism that Indonesia is enjoying today is not unique in Southeast Asia - for there are at least half a dozen economic dynamos in the region today. That prosperity is largely the fruit of a peace that is conducive to cooperation, and that peace itself is the result of an effective approach to defense and security by ASEAN since the conclusion of the Cold War.
With the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the entire Soviet empire, the countries of the world found themselves at a unique juncture in history, a time of both momentous possibility and challenge such as had never been seen since the end of the Second World War.
The significant changes in East-West relations have brought an end to the Cold War and to the bipolar structure of world politics, giving way to increasing multipolarism. Conciliation and concordance among the nations of the world, through political pluralism and economic development, have replaced ideology and ideological contentions. However, at the same time, this renewed confidence in the efficacy of multilateralism in addressing global problems has been somewhat diminished due to the fact that all international issues are not being discussed or settled in the United Nations.
At the same time, deepening interdependence and globalisation of the world economy are highlighting the need for more rational, equitable and mutually beneficial patterns of cooperation for development. The positive transformations in the political domain have yet to be reflected in the economic sphere, where widening disparities and unacceptable inequities continue to aggravate North-South relations. While Indonesia is, of course, developing at a satisfactory rate, we are still far behind the developed countries of the world.
The changing global security environment will no longer be anchored in the bipolarity of East-West contention, rather it will be an environment that is much more complex and, for some time to come, less predictable in its evolution. The transitional period can therefore be expected to be marked by inherent fluidity and instability, as we have seen lately in Bosnia, the Middle East and many other parts of the world.
With regards to the security environment in East Asia and the Pacific, we in ASEAN speak of three levels of spheres of relationships: the first or subregional level, relating to the interactions among countries within the sub-region of Southeast Asia; the second or regional level, embracing the relationships between the countries of Southeast Asia and their neighbours in the wider East Asia/West Pacific region, notably the major powers; and the third or global level, encompassing the relationships among the four major power groups - China, Japan, Russia and the United States - as they interact globally as well as regionally.
One of the many things the ASEAN countries have in common is that they have all benefited from a situation of relative peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region in which trade and investment as well as economic cooperation have flourished. In a very real sense, the dynamic East Asian economies, including the ASEAN countries, are today enjoying the fruits of peace.
This was not always the case - for the history of Southeast Asia is characterised by long periods of instability and strife as a result of the interference of rival external powers compounded by a multiplicity of domestic political and security concerns which varied from country to country. Some of these problems had economic roots: pockets of poverty, social and economic underdevelopment which bred subversion and other forms of destabilising internal disturbances. However, with the launching of ASEAN in 1967, a sea change took place as the member countries steadily and consistently worked to achieve and maintain both their respective national resilience and regional resilience through a broad range of common initiatives in the socio-cultural, economic and political fields. ASEAN has thus given impetus to the achievement of stability in the region, to the broadening and intensification of consultation on political and security issues, and to the growth of cooperation in both the political and economic fields.
It was in 1971, with the Vietnam War still raging, that the foreign ministers of ASEAN - then comprising Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines and Indonesia - had the sagacity to meet in Kuala Lumpur and plan for a post-Vietnam War Southeast Asia. They envisioned a Southeast Asia that would include Vietnam and the rest of the former Indochina, that would be more peaceful, more prosperous and more interdependent. The underlying desire was to find ways of moving towards a condition of greater harmony and stability in which mutually beneficial cooperation could be undertaken so all may be able to develop their economies in common security. Therefore, Indonesia co-presided with France at the Cambodia Conference and co-operated closely with Australia on the efforts to settle the question in that country. Recently, Indonesia facilitated the reconciliation talks between the Government of the Philippines and the Moro National Liberation Front which successfully concluded last month. Indonesia also helped in a series of seminars on the Spratly Islands, although Indonesia is not a claimant country. The principles agreed upon in these seminars were later endorsed by the ASEAN Foreign Ministers. These are all activities of preventive diplomacy.
To promote peace and stability in the region, the ASEAN countries have developed two fundamental approaches to security, the first of which is based on a concept of comprehensive security which embraces, not only the military dimension, but primarily political, economic, social and cultural factors. We would therefore strive to achieve comprehensive security by developing, separately as individual nations and jointly as an Association, the political, economic and socio-cultural strengths which, in addition to a basic military capability, constitute a nation's capacity to cope with security threats whether from within or from without. This is the essence of resilience - national and regional - which we believe can best be achieved, not through military alliances nor through arms build-up, but through confidence-building and cooperation.
This internally directed approach to security is complemented by another fundamental concept applicable in the wider Asia-Pacific region. I refer to the concept of a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) in Southeast Asia which is actually the blueprint for a new framework for regional cooperation. It consists of a set of principles and guidelines that would serve as a code of conduct governing relations among the states within the Zone as well as those outside it. It stipulates the measures and voluntary restraints to which the zonal states as well as the external powers, especially the major powers, should commit themselves. On the part of the Southeast Asian countries, this will entail commensurate political will and greater capacity for peacefully resolving, by themselves, actual and potential conflicts in the region. On the part of the major powers, they would have to review their perceptions of their interests in the region and, as appropriate, adjust their security doctrines and strategies.
In 1976, a year after the end of the Vietnam War, the ASEAN countries quickly moved and agreed on two important documents. The first was the Declaration of ASEAN Concord which provides the statutory basis and framework for political cooperation, and the second was the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC). Some of the elements of the ZOPFAN concept have been incorporated in the TAC to which ASEAN and all other Southeast Asian countries as well as Papua New Guinea have subscribed. The Treaty will be open to non-Southeast Asian powers wishing to commit themselves to its principles and purposes. An essential component of ZOPFAN, the establishment of a Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (NWFZ) in Southeast Asia, became a reality when the ASEAN and other Southeast Asian countries signed the NWFZ Treaty in Bangkok late last year. It is the hope of ASEAN that the nuclear powers will endorse the Treaty by acceding to its protocol.
Although there is today relative peace and stability in the entire Asia-Pacific region, potential conflict and tensions nevertheless persist. The nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula, the overlapping claims over the Spratly Islands and other territorial disputes, the tension between mainland China and Taiwan, all represent potential conflicts which could adversely impact on the security and the economic prosperity of the region.
ASEAN has therefore actively promoted dialogue as a way of managing potential conflict and persistent tensions while building confidence among the countries and powers active in the region. Thus the Post Ministerial Conferences which began in 1979 gradually shifted focus from economic matters to political and security concerns. At their fourth Summit in 1992 in Singapore, the ASEAN countries agreed to further intensify this dialogue on political and security issues with Dialogue Partners within the framework of the Post Ministerial Conference. In 1994, ASEAN launched the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) so that, as Indonesia's Foreign Minister Ali Alatas has put it, "through dialogue and consultation, strategic change in the region could be managed in such a way that a stable relationship among the major powers as well as the regional powers can evolve peacefully over the next decade."
Even as they are seized with political and security concerns, the ASEAN countries have also taken significant steps to integrate themselves with the world economy. They have decided to complete the establishment of an ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) by 2003, 2010 in the case of Vietnam. This would be their contribution to a global regime of free trade and investment.
In the face of growing interdependence and the rapid integration of the world economy, ASEAN as an outward-looking regional organisation, decided at the turn of the last decade that the time had come to widen and intensify cooperation among the Asia-Pacific economies. So when Australia proposed the launching of the consultative forum called Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) in late 1989, the ASEAN countries were among the first to participate and to commit themselves to its objectives. APEC has since then metamorphosed and grown to include 18 of the most dynamic economies in the region. It now has become not merely a forum for consultation but is becoming a more effective vehicle for intensive cooperation and policy coordination. The APEC Economic Leaders Meeting (AELM) in Seattle in 1993, articulated a vision of an Asia-Pacific economic community based on a recognition of the growing interdependence within our economically diverse region, comprising developed, newly industrialised and developing economies. At the second AELM in Bogor in 1994, the APEC Members adopted a set of formidable but realisable objectives and demonstrated their firm commitment to these objectives by setting a time frame within which the goal of free and open trade and investment would be completed - no later than the year 2010 for the developed countries and the year 2020 for developing countries. These objectives were further fleshed out at the third AELM in Osaka, Japan with a concrete plan of action. The plan is expected to be further refined in the AELM in Subic Bay in the Philippines in November this year.
The ASEAN countries are therefore deeply engaged in two vital processes that cover the Asia-Pacific region: the ARF in the political and security field of which they are the driving force, and APEC in the economic field. In addition, together with Asian countries such as Japan, China and Korea we have a forum of dialogue with the European Union known as the Asia Europe Meeting (ASEM). These and the other arrangements and processes in which ASEAN is involved, such as the AFTA and the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, complement one another and constitute a crucial security network and dialogue forum in this part of the world.
Australia has been an important and prominent contributor in the realisation and maintenance of this security network and wisely so, because all countries in the region have a stake in the success of the endeavours of ASEAN to manage potential conflict and promote political and economic cooperation. All countries in the region have a vital stake not only in the continued success of ASEAN as a forum for managing potential conflict and for building mutual confidence, but also in ASEAN remaining an area of economic dynamism, and in the economic success of the individual ASEAN countries, including Indonesia with which Australia shares an extensive common border. Indeed, I believe the security and the aspirations for prosperity of 18 million Australians are consistent and interdependent with the security and the endeavours toward prosperity of some 350 million Southeast Asians, including 195 million Indonesians.
We need to work together on the basis of common interest, mutual respect and benefits and shared responsibility. I hope that my expose has given you a better understanding of Indonesia and its role in the Asian region and I am more than happy to entertain questions anyone may have.
Thank you.
Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia, Canberra - Australia