Address by

H.E. Mr S. Wiryono
Indonesian Ambassador to Australia

At Course 35/96 of the RAN Staff College
Sydney, 10 October 1996

Captain Michael Pike,
Directing staff and students,
Ladies and Gentlemen

First of all I wish to express my appreciation for having been invited to join you on this occasion and share with you some thoughts on Indonesian foreign and defense policies. Indeed, it is both a privilege and an obligation on my part, as well as a matter of self-interest to endeavour to inform you of these policies and receive some reaction and comments. The reason for this is simple: our two countries are the closest of neighbours and the more that next-door neighbours know of one another the better for the entire neighbourhood.

Time and again it has been said that no two countries are as geographically close to each other and yet as far apart from each other culturally, politically, socially, and economically - as Australia and Indonesia. Considering their cultural, political and historical differentiation, it is a matter of course that once in a while misperceptions and misunderstandings occur between the two countries. We should not be disheartened by these. All that we have to do and all we can do is increase our knowledge of each other and work towards greater mutual appreciation. I am therefore more than pleased to be with you today at this prestigious naval institution, an institution which has successfully trained Australian and regional naval officers for quite some time, and share with you some thoughts on Indonesian foreign and defense policies.

Perhaps the first thing that should be said about Indonesian foreign policy is that it has a strong undercurrent of nationalism and independence. This is the force that welds together the hundreds of ethnic groups all over the archipelago of 17,508 islands into a single Indonesian nation. Due to this unique geographical feature and its historical struggle for independence and growth into the Indonesian nation, Indonesia has developed and established a national outlook known as Wawasan Nusantara or archipelagic outlook. In the wording of the declaration of 13 December 1957 all waters, surrounding, between and connecting the islands constituting the Indonesian state, regardless of their extension or breadth, are integral parts of the territory of the -Indonesian state and, therefore part of the internal or national waters which are under the exclusive sovereignty of the Indonesia state. Later, on the 18 February 1960 the firm commitment of the Indonesian government to the archipelago principle was reaffirmed, which is in fact the plication of the principle of national unity to the geographic reality and configuration of Indonesia as an archipelagic state. This confirmed the idea of the unity of the Indonesian nation as contained in the 1928 Pledge of National Unity enacted in the Youth Congress of that year. At the same time, it serves to guide the nation's relations with the outside world. As a result of this strong independent outlook, Indonesia, while still a fledgling republic, adopted what has been termed as "an independent and active foreign policy".

The genesis of such a foreign policy had to do with the fact that right after the Second World War, when Indonesia was fighting to preserve its newly proclaimed independence, the world was beginning to be polarised into the two rival ideological camps of the Cold War. In a speech before the Central National Committee or KNPI, Indonesia's Provisional Legislature in September 1948, the then Vice President and Prime Minister. Mohamad Hatta said: "The Government is of the firm opinion that the best policy to adopt is one which does not make us the object of an international conflict. On the contrary, we must remain the subject who reserves the right to decide our own destiny and fight for our goal, which is independence for the whole of lndonesia".

This statement was an early expression of the non-aligned position that Indonesia would consistently take in international affairs. Essentially, what it means is that Indonesia would like to preserve its independence of judgement and freedom of action. This policy became known as the policy of "mendayung antara dua karang " or "sailing between two reefs". Under such a policy, ideally speaking, it is deemed exceedingly important that Indonesia evaluate every international issue on its own merits without regard to the wishes of either of the two contending blocs in the Cold War or any other consideration apart from the national interest and the good of humankind. Through this policy, Indonesia assumed a posture of independence coupled with a readiness to cooperate with likeminded nations - particularly in the common endeavour to shape a --world order of peace, social justice and equitably shared prosperity.

This approach to foreign policy is by no means unique to Indonesia. There are today some 112 other countries, all members of the United Nations. all of them in the developing world, which profess with varying degrees of intensity, the same attitude of considering international issues purely on their own merits in the light of their respective national interests and the good of humankind. Together with Indonesia, they form the largest and most successful political movement in history, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). It is noted for being at the forefront in the worldwide struggle for decolonisation development, disarmament and the fight to put an end to apartheid. In 1992, Indonesia assumed Chairmanship of this Movement - to nobody's surprise. Because it adopted an "independent and active" foreign policy right after becoming a republic, Indonesia is often described as "born Non-Aligned'. The Non-Aligned Movement itself, while indeed born at the First Summit in Belgrade, Yugoslavia where it was formally institutionalised in 1961, germinated from the Asia-Africa Conference in Bandung in 1955, where the first generation of Leaders of the two continents laid down the Dasa Sila or the Ten Principles of International Relations which the NonAligned Movement later endorsed.

Under Indonesia's chairmanship from September 1992 to October 1995, the Non-aligned Movement succeeded in reinvigorating the North-South dialogue that it hopes will lead to a global partnership for development to address the inequities and imbalances of the current world economic order. At the same time the Movement broadened and intensified South-South cooperation. It also succeeded in getting the seven most industrialised countries (G-7) as well as the World Bank to give due attention to the debt crisis of the highly indebted poor countries. No longer the Chairman of the Movement, Indonesia continues to work actively for causes identified with the Movement, including the solution of the debt crisis, population planning, social reform and the development of a transparent, equitable and rule-based multilateral trading system through the World Trade Organisation.

Though the policy of non-alignment could be stated in utter simplicity, its implementation could be quite complex. As in the case of Indonesia. it could take one course or another under the influence of permanent factors - such as geography and the psychological make-up of the Indonesian people - and variables such as the external environment, the economic circumstances of the time. and the country's unique perception of these circumstances. After Indonesia had gone through the chaos of 1965, and after the failed coup attempt of the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI), the Indonesian government passed the Investment Law of 1967 which was designed to attract Western investors - something unthinkable in the previous years. At the same time, this measure represented a moving away from the socialist bloc. Still, Indonesia maintained its independent and active foreign policy. Viewed entirely on its own merits, that was one of the moves that paved the way for Indonesia's economic recovery and, subsequently consistently high export driven economic growth. Today the New Order Government led by President Soeharto continues to build strong economic links with the West as well as with all other countries that would enter into a mutually beneficial economic partnership with Indonesia - without in any way compromising its independent foreign policy.

This policy has worked well for the Indonesian economy. Today, Indonesia has a GDP of US $210 billion and a per capita income of about US$1,000 and is the biggest economy in Southeast Asia. Growing at an annual average of seven percent for the past two decades, Indonesia in 1995 grew by 8.07 percent, surpassing the Government forecast of 7.5 percent and the 7.8 percent growth during the previous year. Such consistently high economic growth created some 45 million new jobs between 1971 and 1994. Thus the incidence of poverty has been reduced from 60 percent of the population a quarter of a century ago to 13.5 percent today. In the meantime. the population has increased from 145 million in 1920 to 195 million in 1995. Exercising fiscal prudence and restraint, the Government has managed to keep the inflation rate under two digits; it has also succeeded in diversifying the economy away from oil. Some 13 years ago, the Government launched a sustained programme of opening up the economy through a series of deregulation and debureaucratisation packages that have greatly liberalised its import policies and made it even more attractive to foreign investors.

In achieving all these, Indonesia has been guided by a basic concept called the "Trilogy of Development". In endeavouring to achieve the "take-off' towards industrialisation and to ensure continued socioeconomic growth. Indonesia will continue to be guided by this concept which prescribes three inseparable and mutually supportive conditions: stability to make growth possible, growth in order to create new wealth to share and equitable sharing of the responsibilities of the fruits of development. None of these three elements may be emphasised at the expense of any of the others, for there can be no growth without equitable distribution of the burdens of development, and there can be no fruits of development to distribute without growth. Without equitable distribution of the fruits, there can be no national stability, and without a dynamic national stability, there can be no economic growth.

The economic dynamism that Indonesia is enjoying today is not unique in Southeast Asia - for there are at least half a dozen economic dynamos in the region today. That prosperity is largely the fruit of a peace that is conducive to cooperation, and that peace itself is the result of an effective approach to defense and security.

In the case of Indonesia. defense policy has never been an exclusively military affair. Our defense policy is inspired by and founded on our own experience in the struggle for independence in which after proclamation, the people at large took up arms; hence the origin of the people's army. From the very beginning, we realised that the size and armaments of the Armed Forces of Indonesia (ABRI), unless we spent most of the national budget on defense, would never be sufficient to defend the country from a determined invader with abundant resources. Indonesia's defense and security policy is therefore based on the concept of Sishankamrata which may be roughly translated as the "Total People's Defense and Security System". Under this concept, every Indonesian is enjoined to help build, maintain and consolidate the national territory - and this includes a great deal of marine territory - as one political, economic, sociocultural. defense and security system. The military is just one part of this system. That is why Indonesia's armed forces are organised and deployed on a territorial basis. And that is why if the sale of the F-16 jet aircraft from the United States is cancelled, it would have little impact on Indonesia's defense posture - the acquisition of this kind of aircraft is not a top priority. Of course, we need such aircraft to keep our pilots abreast with the latest technological advances in defense aviation. but we feel no urgent need to acquire particular equipment from a particular source. We could always acquire them later. In any case, over the short and medium term, we do not believe that Indonesia will be invaded by a foreign power.

In a military exercise such as the one held recently on the Natuna Island. it was a matter of course that there was an imaginary enemy who had invaded the island and had to be dislodged from there. That was the purpose of the exercise. I doubt if an exercise of that kind could be held without imagining an "enemy". However. we believe that currently, the real threat to Indonesia is not an invading armada but subversion from within or the disintegration of its social fabric which could be the result of widespread perceptions of social injustice. Against this we must always be on guard. That is why Indonesian defense policy calls for national resilience which can only be achieved through the integration of the political, economic, sociocultural as well as the military and defense strengths of the Indonesian people.

At the same time. it is also a matter of highest priority that Indonesia promotes close and harmonious relations with its immediate neighbours: Papua New Guinea, Australia and New Zealand as well as other Asian countries. including and especially the other Southeast Asian countries. That is why Indonesia accords so much importance to ASEAN and cooperation in the context of ASEAN, which is one of the cornerstones of Indonesian foreign policy.

In its endeavours to promote peace and stability in Southeast Asia and the rest of the Asia-Pacific region, ASEAN has developed two fundamental approaches. The first is based on a concept of comprehensive security which, apart from the military dimension. also involves political, economic and social aspects of security.

We in ASEAN believe that the best way to achieve comprehensive security would be to develop, as individual nations and as an association of nations , the political, economic and sociocultural strengths which, in addition to a basic military capability , would enable us to defend ourselves against threats from within and from outside. This is the concept of national and regional resilience which, we believe, we can achieve not through arms build-up nor through alliances with military powers but through regional cooperation.

Complementing this internal approach to security is another basic concept which is meant for application in the wider Asia Pacific region - the concept of a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) in Southeast Asia. Essentially, it is the blueprint of a code of conduct governing relations among the states within the Zone as well as those outside it. It stipulates the restraints to which the states in the Zone as well as the outside powers, particularly the major powers, would commit them selves. Once this concept is accepted and implemented by all concerned. the resulting regime would make unnecessary any military intervention on the part of the major powers and would deter the regional powers from ever again inviting or provoking major power intervention in their bilateral problems. For the regime to work, the Southeast Asian countries would have to develop the political will and the capability to peacefully resolve their actual and potential conflicts - such as in the South China Sea. The major powers, on the other hand, will have to reassess their interests in the region and make the necessary adjustments in their security doctrines and strategies.

Although ZOPFAN has not yet become a reality, some of its elements have already been incorporated in the 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) to which all ten Southeast Asian countries and Papua New Guinea have subscribed. Non-Southeast Asian powers that wish to associate themselves with the principles and purposes of the TAC will soon be able to do so as the Treaty is opened for accession.

A major security development in Southeast Asia is the recent signing by all ten countries of the region, the Treaty on the establishment of a Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (NWFZ) in December last year. ASEAN is now working hard to ensure that the nuclear powers will eventually endorse it by acceding to the protocol of the Treaty.

A major exercise in preventive diplomacy in the most positive sense was the launching in 1994 of the ASEAN Regional Forum so that, in the words of Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas "… through dialogue and consultation, strategic change in the region could be managed in such a way that a stable relationship among the major powers as well as the regional powers can evolve peacefully over the next decade". Besides the ASEAN countries. ARF participants include ASEAN's Dialogue Partner Countries which include Australia, Consultative Partner Countries and Observer countries. Together they constitute all the major powers as well as the regional states whose activities and interests have an impact on the security of the region.

ASEAN has always been very much aware of the growing interdependence and globalisation of the world economy. As an outward-looking regional Association aware of this trend, ASEAN at the end of the last decade was actively looking for new and more effective modalities for wider and more intensive cooperation among the economies of the Asia-Pacific region. It so happened in 1989, Australia was taking the initiative in organising a consultative forum that would be called the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). As far as Indonesia and the other ASEAN countries at that time were concerned. the timing was perfect and they at once indicated their readiness to participate in the forum. Since then, APEC has grown rapidly to include 18 of the most dynamic economies in the region. The APEC process has gone beyond consultation to vigorous policy coordination and concerted action. There have been so far three APEC Economic Leaders Meetings. The first was in Seattle in 1993 where APEC enunciated a vision of an Asia-Pacific economic community based on a recognition of the growing interdependence within the economically diverse Asia-Pacific, in which are found developed, newly industrialising and developing economies. It was at the Second AELM in Bogor, Indonesia that AIPEC adopted a set of ambitious but realisable objectives. Specifically,, the APEC economies adopted a time frame within which the goal of free and open trade and investment would be completed in the Asia-Pacific: no later than the year 2020 in the case of the developing economies and 2010 in the case of the developed ones. At the Third AELM in Osaka, these objectives were further fieshed out with a concrete plan of action. And in the coming fourth AELM in Manila, individual action plans are going to be presented.

There are therefore two vital processes covering the Asia-Pacific region in which the ASEAN countries are engaged. ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), ASEAN is, of course, the driving force - this covers the political and security field. In the economic field, ASEAN countries'. except for Vietnam which became an ASEAN member only last year, are deeply involved in the APEC process. These, together with other processes and arrangements in which ASEAN is involved, such as the SEANWFZ, the AFTA and the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, support and complement each other and form a vital security web in this part of the world.

Because Australia is also very much involved in many of these processes. notably the ARF, APEC and the ASEAN Dialogue process, it may be said that at the regional level, Australia and Indonesia are cooperating closely to contribute to the security and prosperity of the region and ultimately of the world at large.

Relations between our two countries are therefore generally excellent. There has never been a time when any number of Indonesians ever considered any of their neighbours to the south as a source or occasion of danger to security. However. it sometimes saddens me that there are a great number of Australians who look north with misgivings and apprehension and consider Indonesia an occasion of danger to their security.

The _Security Agreement of 1995 between Australia and Indonesia. hopefully, will erase much of that suspicion and bring the relations between our two peoples to a new level of confidence. To my mind, this Security Agreement is of vital strategic importance. It is, right now. largely a confidence building measure and I hope that because of it, Australians will begin to look at Indonesia in a new light - as a bridge to the rest of Asia in Australia's bid to integrate itself economically with Asia and to gain access to the vast Asian market.

Actually as part of the Defence Cooperation, the Security Agreement was instated before the official signing in 1995 through a number of fora that exist between our two countries. Navy to Navy contact was established in 1972 with the joint exercises "Southern Cross". "Operation Orion" and "Operation Spica" The frequency of joint exercises and visits increased with "New Horizon", "Passage Exercise Ausina" and "Exercise Cassowary", which are regularly conducted as patrol exercises in the Timor Gap. In addition, during the past two years the relationship between the two navies has been strengthened through the forum of "Navy to Navy Talks" that is conducted every year at the Deputy Chief of Naval Staff level.

In the broader Armed Forces sphere. a forum was established in 1994 known as the Australia Indonesia Defence Policy Committee (AIDPC) which promotes greater cooperation between ABRI and the Australian Defence Forces (ADF). Below AIDPC is the Australia Indonesia Defence Coordination Committee (AIDCC) and it is supported by five working groups: operations and exercise, training and personnel exchange, logistics, communication and electronic warfare and defence science and technology. At the top or Ministerial level, both the Australian and Indonesian Defence Ministers meet once a year. This year the meeting will be held in Indonesia in November.

As to the irritations that now and then come out in a rash in the relations of our two countries,' I believe that these are largely cultural in nature. Very often, it is just a matter of the fact that what is perfectly normal in Australia could be scandalous in Indonesia. For example, many Australians are freely judgemental on the internal workings of the political . economic and social system of Indonesia. And when there was some rioting in a few city blocks in Jakarta as a result of an internal dispute in one of the registered political parties, the Australian mass media reported it with such an enthusiasm as would make the average Indonesian wonder if Australia were a friendly country.

For Indonesians, being a thoroughly Oriental people, are less comfortable with too direct and strong criticism bordering on attack, whether they are doing the criticising or being criticised. Pointing a finger at another person in Indonesia is considered arrogant, and if you do, you are likely to be reminded that when you point a finger, only that finger is directed at the one you accuse while three fingers are pointed back at yourself. For this reason. the Indonesian press does not comment much on anything that it may perceive as negative developments in Australia. and finds it difficult to understand the "glee" with which the Australian press covered the July 27 incident in Jakarta.

Cultural differences are not at all insurmountable. As I said at the beginning: all we need to do and all we can do is try to get to know and appreciate each other better. And in any case, even as I speak, changes are taking place in Indonesia today as a result of the relative prosperity that my country now enjoys, the growth of a confident and sometimes impatient middle class, and the increasing enlightenment of the Indonesian public. As Indonesia achieves further socioeconomic development, it is inevitable that there would also have to be political development, the fine-tuning of our political institutions and processes, meaning further democratisation. But there will be no overnight transformations. The forces for change are well matched by the forces for the conservation of all the good that we already have which might be lost through rapid change. This is as it should be.

There are also things that are not subject to change. They include Indonesia's independent and active foreign policy and its defense policy that is based on the concept of comprehensive security. Besides. these are no longer exclusively Indonesian they have been for a long time now embedded in the Non-Aligned Movement and in the regional security and economic cooperation web that has been woven by ASEAN.

I hope that these thoughts I have just shared with you will contribute to a better understanding of Indonesia by the future leaders of the Australian. as well as other regional military establishments. I am more than happy to entertain questions, if there are any.

Thank you.